What did J.P. Morgan forecast for private equity returns?
A lower number for the asset class and a higher one for its smallest companies. J.P. Morgan Asset Management put private equity at 9.8 percent a year over the next ten to fifteen years, down from 10.2 percent, while small cap private equity rose to 10.6 percent from 10.1 percent (J.P. Morgan Asset Management, 2027 Long-Term Capital Market Assumptions, 19 October 2026).
The assumptions are the firm's 31st annual edition, built by what it describes as "a team of 90-plus industry-leading portfolio managers, economists and research analysts worldwide to produce these return assumptions for 200-plus assets in more than 20 base currencies", with estimates as of 30 September 2026 (same report). They are forecasts for setting strategic asset allocations, not a record of what any fund earned.
The headline moved down because the largest slice of it did. Large and mega cap private equity fell to 9.6 percent from 10.2 percent, which the firm attributes to the cost of debt: "higher financing costs trim large cap private equity median manager returns by 60bps, to 9.6%" (same report). Mid cap edged up to 10.0 percent from 9.9 percent.
Why did large cap and small cap private equity move in opposite directions?
Because the two are paid by different things. Large deals carry more debt, so a higher cost of debt takes more out of them; small deals depend more on what changes inside the company. J.P. Morgan writes that "this focus on operational efficiency and firm-level productivity boosts small cap private equity's returns relative to large cap, with additional support coming from resource bottlenecks that may trap some returns at the local level" (same report).
The published composite hides the split, because of how it is built. The report weights its private equity composite "65% large cap and mega cap, 25% mid cap and 10% small cap" (same report). On our arithmetic that weighting reproduces the printed figure exactly: 0.65 times 9.6, plus 0.25 times 10.0, plus 0.10 times 10.6, is 9.80. Two thirds of the headline is the one band that fell.
The order has reversed. A year ago the firm's large and mega cap assumption, at 10.2 percent, sat a tenth of a point above its small cap assumption of 10.1. This year small cap sits a full point above large and mega cap. That is a swing of 1.1 points, or 110 basis points, in the relative standing of large against small, on our subtraction of the firm's two editions.
| Asset class | 2027 | 2026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Private equity, small cap | 10.6% | 10.1% | +50bps |
| Private equity, mid cap | 10.0% | 9.9% | +10bps |
| Private equity, cap-weighted composite | 9.8% | 10.2% | -40bps |
| Private equity, large and mega cap | 9.6% | 10.2% | -60bps |
| Venture capital | 8.8% | 8.5% | +30bps |
| Direct lending | 7.8% | 7.7% | +10bps |
| U.S. core real estate | 8.1% | 8.2% | -10bps |
| Global core infrastructure | 7.1% | 6.5% | +60bps |
| U.S. large cap equity | 7.5% | 6.7% | +80bps |
Is the forecast return coming from the market or from the business?
Increasingly from the business. The report splits each assumption into beta, the part that comes with the market, and alpha, the part a manager adds. For large cap private equity the beta fell from 8.0 to 6.6 while the alpha rose from 2.2 to 3.0, so a lower total rests on a larger contribution from the manager (J.P. Morgan Asset Management, 2027 Long-Term Capital Market Assumptions, Exhibit 8). On our arithmetic, alpha went from 22 percent of the large cap total to 31 percent.
Small cap moved the same way without the drag: beta from 7.4 to 7.6 and alpha from 2.7 to 3.1 (same exhibit). The firm defines that alpha as a regression intercept, "the sum of the intercepts" in the case of private equity, so it is the residual after market exposure is accounted for, not a promise any particular manager will earn it.
The firm expects the spread between managers to widen with it: "In private equity, greater performance dispersion will reinforce the shift from multiple expansion to repeatable value creation, governance and operational alpha" (same report). It makes the same point about lenders, expecting "a wider gap" between "lenders that actively engage with their borrowers vs. more passive lenders that simply provide capital" (same report). Its own direct lending assumption barely moved, to 7.8 percent from 7.7.
“A forecast that pays the buyer for operating improvement rather than for leverage changes what the buyer needs from the company. The question in the room stops being how much debt the business will carry, and becomes how much better it can be made to run. Owners who can already answer that are selling into the part of the forecast that went up.”
What does this mean for an owner selling a smaller company?
That the capital aimed at your size of business now carries the higher expected return of the two. In our judgement that is a better position to sell from than the reverse, because a buyer's forecast return is the budget out of which a price is paid: the band of the market with the stronger forecast has more room to pay than the band whose forecast fell.
Three things follow, in our judgement. First, the case a buyer has to make internally is now an operating case, so the diligence will push harder on how the business runs without its owner and on what a new owner could change. Second, the gap between what the company earns today and what it could earn under better systems is doing more of the work in the buyer's model, which makes that gap worth identifying and evidencing before a process rather than conceding it during one. Third, leverage is a smaller part of the answer than it was, so an owner should expect less of the price to depend on how much debt the buyer can raise against the business.
Set against public markets, the forecast still pays for the illiquidity, and pays more at the small end. The firm raised its U.S. large cap equity assumption 80 basis points, to 7.5 percent, on "profit margins of over 15%" (same report). On our arithmetic that leaves small cap private equity 3.1 points ahead of U.S. large cap equity, against 2.1 points for large and mega cap private equity.
What should an owner watch from here?
Whether the money follows the forecast down-market. An assumption is a view, not a flow, and the capital already raised sits at the other end of the market: the report notes that "global buyout dry powder stands at USD 1.3 trillion, the majority raised in 2022-23 fund vintages", crediting Bain & Company for the figure (same report). That capital was raised against the older order, when large was forecast to out-earn small.
Two readings are possible, in our judgement. If next year's edition keeps small cap ahead and the pile of large-deal capital keeps ageing, expect more of it to be spent further down-market than it was raised for, which brings larger, better-funded buyers into processes smaller than they used to run. If financing costs ease and the large cap assumption recovers, the pressure comes off and the order could revert. Either way the operating case the buyer has to make is the part that has already changed.
As of 13 November 2026
Sources: J.P. Morgan Asset Management, 2027 Long-Term Capital Market Assumptions, 31st annual edition, released 19 October 2026 with estimates as of 30 September 2026, read first-hand, for the private equity cap-weighted composite of 9.8 percent against 10.2 percent, small cap of 10.6 against 10.1, mid cap of 10.0 against 9.9 and large and mega cap of 9.6 against 10.2; venture capital of 8.8 against 8.5; direct lending of 7.8 against 7.7; U.S. core real estate of 8.1 against 8.2; global core infrastructure of 7.1 against 6.5; the U.S. large cap equity assumption of 7.5 percent, up 80 basis points, and the profit-margin sentence quoted; the sentence on higher financing costs trimming large cap median manager returns by 60 basis points; the sentence on operational efficiency and firm-level productivity lifting small cap relative to large cap; the composite weighting of 65 percent large and mega cap, 25 percent mid cap and 10 percent small cap; the beta and alpha decomposition for large cap private equity (8.0 and 2.2, then 6.6 and 3.0), small cap private equity (7.4 and 2.7, then 7.6 and 3.1) and direct lending (5.7 and 2.0, then 5.8 and 2.1) and the definition of that alpha as a regression intercept; the sentences on performance dispersion in private equity and on engaged against passive lenders; the description of the team and coverage behind the edition; and the global buyout dry powder footnote of USD 1.3 trillion, which the report credits to Bain & Company, Global Private Equity Report 2026. The subtraction of the two editions shown as the change column, the reconciliation of the composite from its three size bands, the 110 basis point swing in small cap against large cap, alpha as a share of the total return, the comparison of private equity assumptions with the U.S. large cap equity assumption, and every reading of what the figures mean for an owner selling a company are our arithmetic and our judgement. The companion articles cited for operating improvement as a return source and for the buyer list at a size threshold carry their own sources.
Corrections: factual errors are corrected on the page and the correction dated. Write to admin@kadenwoodcapital.com.
This position sits within our sell-side M&A advisory practice.

